Somtimes situations create popular opinions that are so obvious, so simple, that they are almost certainly misinformed – or at the very least, not considering the whole picture.
That might be the case for two of the biggest issues in international agriculture today. I’m speaking of the Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) Ronda de Doha sobre política comercial y auge de los biocombustibles. En general, se considera que ambos son cambios monumentales que tendrán un efecto positivo en la agricultura mundial.
I’m not arguing here that this will not happen. Given the right set of circumstances, one or both could live up to the lofty expectations set upon them. But there is reason to doubt both Doha and biofuels, and some compelling arguments against either shaking out the way they are envisioned to.
Para comenzar con la Ronda de Doha, que fue noticia en junio cuando representantes de Estados Unidos, la UE, Brasil e India se reunieron en Potsdam, Alemania, hay mucho espacio para el escepticismo. Potsdam fue el escenario de otra ruptura en las negociaciones, ya que los representantes de Brasil e India se retiraron de la mesa y terminaron la reunión antes de tiempo.
Fue el último de una serie de derrumbes que han plagado la Ronda de Doha desde que comenzó en 2001 (que, dicho sea de paso, es el resultado de otro fracaso; la Ronda estaba programada para comenzar en 1999 en la OMC Conference in Seattle, US, and to be known as the “Seattle Round”). However, the inability of governments to find common ground is not the only reason to question Doha.
While I consider myself a free trade advocate, I have begun to doubt the intentions of some of the nations in Doha. The spirit of Doha at its inception was one of fair trade, of improving the situations of the world’s poorest countries through a “development agenda.” However, there appears now to be different motivations – ones that see the world’s most powerful developed and developing countries wrangling for market access, leaving poor nations – and any reference to “development” – out of the discussion.
Duda sobre la utilidad última de Doha is supported by several sobering pieces of evidence. The World Bank, which had estimated that Doha would benefit poor countries by US $60 billion per year, has slashed that figure down to US $16 billion, with much of that going to the most advanced developing countries. Similarly, the EU’s recent “Impact Assessment” reported that many poor countries would be hurt by Doha more than helped.
En el caso de los biocombustibles, el caso es más sencillo. Como saben muchos lectores de la FCI, creo que mientras los biocombustibles formen parte de las agendas nacionales, sería un error pensar en ellos en términos de competitividad. Es una industria politizada y, como tal, será alimentada por los gobiernos.
Pero eso no lo hace invulnerable. En una conversación con Jim Hines, director ejecutivo de RiceCo, he mentioned several points that might reverse public opinion on biofuels, which could endanger its status as a political darling. Among his concerns were a reaction from OPEC that would drive oil prices higher, as well as “the backlash to the cost of milk, meat, canned products which use corn starch … also the availability of raw materials for propanil and diuron.”
FCI reader Alan McCracken also expressed doubts, saying, “when consumers realize the true costs of ethanol from corn and the poor fuel efficiency, they will revolt and kill the project.” As a regular driver in Brazil, McCracken added that he had experienced first-hand the decreased fuel efficiency of Flex-Fuel cars.
Estos puntos no quieren decir que el biocombustible o Doha estén condenados. Pero como cualquier tendencia importante, hay aspectos de las historias que reciben poca atención. Cuanto más conscientes seamos de todos los diferentes ángulos, más preparados estaremos para adaptarnos a los cambios que producen.